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More than fifty years after the initial drafting of Article 31
and six years2 after the failed attempt to promulgate the Uniform
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L See Lary Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Suggested Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L.
REV. 115, 124 n.73 (1983) (identifying prior drafts and the years they were
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New Payments Code,3 in 1990 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated Revised
Article 3 to the Uniform Commercial Code ("Revised Article 3").4
Former Article 3 received much criticism.' Unfortunately,
Revised Article 3 is not hailed as a work of great clarity, as it
fails in may ways to enlighten what is often considered one of the
most complex and difficult areas of commercial law.6 Quite the
contrary, Revised Article 3 presents sections in a wordy, verbose
style,7 containing: (1) traps for the unwary or untutored, (2)
proposed).
2. See Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAW. 1007,
1008 (1996) (recounting the determination by the Permanent Editorial Board in
June 1984 that the intense criticism received by the New Payments Code justified
discontinuing its attempted promulgation).
3. With burgeoning electronic commerce and surging innovations in electronic
payment devices, the time is ripe for a unitary approach to multifaceted payment
systems. At the average checkout counter, a purchaser is confronted with the option
of using a debit card or a credit card; drawing and issuing a check; permitting the
merchant to draft the check for the customer's signature; or using or reusing an
electronic check. Certainly now, a new payments code would provide guidance in
resolving conflicts and disputes that are bound to surface.
4. See U.C.C. art. 3 (1990). [Ed. Note: Throughout this article, Revised Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is distinguished from Former Article 3 by
referencing its year of promulgation, 1990. All references to Former Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code are made to the prior year, 1989.]
5. See, e.g., Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Payor Bank's Right to Recover
Mistaken Payments: Survival of Common Law Restitution Under Proposed Revisions
to Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4, 65 IND. L.J. 779, 780-81 (1989-1990)
(asserting that Former Article 3 was unclear as to whether it displaces common law
restitutionary actions and fails to clarify the rules regarding a bank's right to
restitution in mistaken payment cases); Sarah Howard Jenkins, A Payee Who Is a
Holder in Due Course May Be Subject to Personal Defenses Arising from
Unauthorized Acts or Promises by an Agent, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 191, 194-96
(1990) (criticizing Former Article 3's ambiguity with regard to which defense a
payee, who satisfies the requirements for holder in due course status, is subject);
Lawrence, supra note 1, at 119-20 (calling for a complete revision); Julian B.
McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 683, 686-87 (1993) (detailing how Former Article 3 risked becoming obsolete by
the time of enactment).
6. See Ada Long-Croom, Unauthorized and Forged Indorsements: A Glitch in
Revised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 349,
351, 379-80 (1997) (demonstrating how Revised Article 3 leaves a major loophole in
attempting to shift loss allocation to the negligent payee on a forged indorsement,
allowing the negligent party to avoid the loss). See generally Edward L. Rubin,
Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of
Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993) (narrating the
process by which the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated Revised Article 3
and decrying the lack of representation by consumer groups and the intense
lobbying by the ALI and the NCCUSL on behalf of the banking industry).
7. See generally Louis F. Del Duca et al., Applying Plain English Techniques
in Revising the UCC, 29 UCC L.J. 428 (1997) (identifying ways in which the UCC
could be improved by drafting with an eye towards readability); Steven 0. Weise,
"Plain English" Will Set the UCC Free, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 371 (1994)
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serious omissions,8 and (3) rules that are unjustified by and
inconsistent with historical and contemporary thought.! During
Revised Article 3's short nine-year history, much of the period
has been spent winning acceptance in the various statehouses
across the nation." In fact, New York, a major commercial law
jurisdiction, has yet to sign-on to the revision." Revised Article 3
does contain, however, many redeeming features. For example,
Revised Article 3 adopts agency rules consistent with prevailing
agency law principles;' accord and satisfaction rules that
accommodate the modern processing of payments made to large
businesses through lock boxes;' and clarification of the conflict
between the rules on restitution for mistaken payment and final
payment,14 just to mention a few.
Despite the short history of Revised Article 3, this Article
urges the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to confront the difficult
and unpleasant issue of revising, yet again, Revised Article 3 to
correct the aberrant suretyship rules. Revised Article 3 contains
suretyship rules, the law governing one of the most prevalent
(recommending techniques to improve the readability of the UCC, making it easier
to interpret and apply by courts and practitioners).
& One such omission appears in Section 3-309, which is entitled
"Enforcement of Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Instrument." U.C.C. § 3-309 (1990). The
remedial rights granted in the section are unavailable, by definition, to a remitter or
purchaser of cashier's checks. See id. This omission was corrected by the 1991
amendment, which added Section 3-312 to Revised Article 3. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO
UNIFORAI COMIERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 3, amend. 1. cmt. 1 (1991). The
states that enacted Revised Article 3 before the amendment must amend their prior
adoption, or banks must insist on a lost instruments bond or other devices to protect
themselves in the event a holder in due course presents the purportedly lost
instrument. See id.; U.C.C. § 3-309 (1990).
9. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-605 (1990) (eliminating, for example, the necessity of a
creditor to explicitly reserve rights against an accommodation party and alloving
the creditor to make material modifications to the contractual relationship between
the parties, thereby changing the risk assumed by the accommodation party without
her consent). Refer to notes 135-45 infra and accompanying text (critiquing this
change).
10. See State UCC Variations Binder, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC), at xix-x- (Jun.
1999) (showing enactment dates for Revised Article 3 ranging from mid-1991 up to
early 1998).
11 See id. at xix. As of June 1999, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and three U.S. territories (the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, and
the territory of Guam) had not adopted Revised Article 3. See id. Massachusetts only
recently enacted Revised Article 3 in May of 1998. See id.
12. See U.C.C. § 3-402 cmt. 1 (1990) (eliminating the Former Article 3
exception to ordinary agency law and binding an undisclosed principal to an
instrument, even if she has not signed it).
13. See U.C.C. § 3-311(c) (1990).
146 See U.C.C. §§ 3-418 & cmt. 1, 4-215(d) (1990).
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credit enhancement devices, that diverge without reasonable
justification from both historical and contemporary principles.
This Article illustrates, through the use of a hypothetical
problem, the potential for confusion that results when Revised
Article 3's conflicting rules must be applied simultaneously with
general suretyship law as reflected in the Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship and Guaranty ("Restatement").5 In addition to
recommending the revision of the suretyship rules, this Article
identifies several other needed revisions. 6
Initially, this call for revision raises as a concern the use of
the supplementary PEB Commentary as a quasi-legislative tool
to address problems inherent in the revised Article's suretyship
rules. In the context of these rules, what is the impact of the PEB
Commentary, substantially modifying or revising the Official
Comments, on those jurisdictions that codified the revision prior
to the substantial modification? Does a non-uniform adoption
result?
I. PEB COMMENTARY
In 1987, the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) was empowered by the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to issue supplemental commentary on the
UCC.'7 PEB Commentary may be used: (1) to resolve an
ambiguity by stating what the PEB considers to be the legal rule;
(2) to state a preferred resolution if judicial opinions or scholarly
writings diverge; (3) to elaborate on the application of the UCC if
the statute or Official Comments create doubt as to its
applicability to particular circumstances or transactions; (4) to
apply the principles of the UCC to new or changed
circumstances, consistent with Section 1-102(2)(b); (5) to clarify
or elaborate on the operation of the UCC with other statutes
(such as the Bankruptcy Code and various federal and state
consumer protection statutes) and general principles of law and
equity pursuant to UCC Section 1-103; or (6) to otherwise
improve the operation of the UCC."8 Use of the PEB Commentary
15. Refer to notes 97-237 infra and accompanying text.
16. Refer to notes 237-99 infra and accompanying text.
17. See PEB Resolution on Purposes, Standards, and Procedures for PEB
Commentary to the UCC, (Mar. 14, 1987), reprinted in [Findex & PEB Commentary
Binder] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC), at vii (1990) [hereinafter PEB Resolution]; see also
Huffman v. Altec Intl, Inc., 546 N.W.2d 162, 165 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
(referring to the PEB as the "watchdog" of the Uniform Commercial Code).
18. See PEB Resolution, supra note 17, at vii.
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to supplement the Official Comments prevents obsolescence 9 and
promotes uniformity of construction.' Several courts have cited
the PEB Commentary in support of or as authority for their
holdings."'
Although the Official Comments are not part of the statute
unless affirmatively enacted,' they should be deemed part of the
legislative history of the adopted statutes and should be treated
as an extrinsic aid relevant for construing the statutes and
determining legislative intent at the time the statutes were
adopted.' Because the Official Comments were "clearly and
19. See Peter Winship, As the World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code "In the Light of Comparative Law," 29 LOY.
LA. L. REV. 1143, 1152-53 (1996) (discussing how Professor Schlesinger's
recommendation to "constantly recodify" the UCC to avoid obsolescence ultimately
led to the creation of the PEB).
20. See Fred H. Miller & Donald J. Rapson, Status Report on the UCC-1998, in
THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 15, 16 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Dec. 10, 1998), available in Westlaw, SD30 ALI-ABA 1.
2L See, e.g., Bluegrass Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 942 F.2d
381, 386 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing the PEB Commentary to clarify a potential conflict
between two sections of Article 9); In re Solfanelli v. Meridian Bank, 206 B.R. 699,
711 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing the PEB Commentary as authority for the
proposition that a breach of the obligation of good faith cannot be used to support an
independent cause of action), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 230 B.R.
54 (M.D. Pa. 1999); In re LMS Holding Co., 153 B.R. 581, 584 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1993) (supporting its holding that a security interest extends to after-acquired
property not transferred by the debtor by reference to PEB Commentary), reo'd on
other grounds sub nor., LMS Holding Co. v. Core-Mark Mid-Continent, Inc., 50 F.3d
1520 (10th Cir. 1995); Florida E. Coast Properties, Inc. v. Best Contract Furnishings,
Inc., 593 So. 2d 560, 562 & n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (relying on the PEB
Commentary, revising the Official Comment to Section 2-507, which had limited the
right of reclamation in cash sales to the same ten day period imposed in credit
transactions under Section 2-702, as an unjustified limitation on the implied
continuation in the statute of the common law precedent); Continental Grain Co. v.
Heritage Bank, 548 N.W.2d 507, 512 & n.1 (S.D. 1996) (Konenkamp, J., concurring)
(citing PEB Commentary No. 1 Section 2-507, which eliminated any specific time
limit for a cash seller to exercise the right of reclamation).
22. The UCC Reporting Service in the State UCC Variations volume
incorrectly includes as a variation for 33 jurisdictions the codification of the Official
Comments. See generally State UCC Variations Binder, UCC Rep. Serv. (CBC)
(March 1999).
23. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on 'Purpose' in the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 OIO ST. L.J. 419, 436-41 & n.63, 448-55 (1997)
(observing that the comments should be the single best source of purpose and policy
but questioning the validity of that assumption given the historical process followed
in their drafting). But see American Nat l Bank of Denver v. Christensen, 476 P.2d
281, 285-86 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that limiting the protections of Section 2-
326(3) to general creditors based on the language of comment 2, to construe the term
"creditor" rather than the general definition of creditor from Section 1-201(12), was
an error by the trial court, relying on the Preface to the Uniform Commercial Code
as enacted by the Colorado Legislature, which states that "official comments, the
references contained in these comments and the cross references are nonstatutory
and the inclusion of this nonstatutory matter is for the purpose of information
1999] 887
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prominently communicated" or were at least avilable to the
various legislatures when the bills enacting the UCC were being
considered, the individual legislators' understanding of the bills,
presumably, was influenced by the views of the draftspersons or
sponsoring agencies; and the views expressed in the Official
Comments provide persuasive evidence to courts, educators, and
practitioners for determining the statutes' meaning.24
Additionally, traditional principles of statutory construction
recognize that a statute should not be limited to those situations
within the contemplation of the legislature when the statute was
adopted and that judicial authority extends to the application of
the purpose and policy of the statute in unforeseen contexts. 25
Furthermore, use of "extra-legislative" source materials when
legislative resources do not resolve a question is a well-
established principle within the traditional approaches to
statutory interpretation2 ' and is consistent with the stated
function of the Resolution authorizing the issuing of the PEB
Commentary.27
Moreover, proponents of less traditional approaches, such as
dynamic statutory interpretation, advance a thesis that statutory
interpretation should be dynamic; that is, the interpretation of a
only.").
24. Norman J. Singer, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.12 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 2A SUTHERLAND]; Norman J.
Singer, 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52.05 (5th ed.
1992) [hereinafter 2B SUTHERLAND]; accord Jinright v. Russell, 182 S.E.2d 328, 330
(Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (noting that by virtue of the Official Comments, "The legislature
had the benefit of the drafter's interpretations when it enacted the Code.., and we
cannot say that it intended something else . . .") (quoting Kramer v. Johnson, 176
S.E.2d 108, 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970)); Pastor v. National Rep. Bank of Chicago, 371
N.E.2d 1127, 1128-29 (IlM. App. Ct. 1977) (determining whether the Illinois
Commercial Code permitted assignment of an irrevocable letter of credit by the
beneficiary by reviewing the evolution of the final draft and official comments to the
UCC to determine the legislature's intent), aff'd, 390 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1979); John
Deer Co. v. Jeff DeWitt Auction Co., 690 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("[IIn
construing uniform model acts enacted by the General Assembly, [the court] must
assume [the legislature] did so with the intention of adopting the accompanying
interpretations placed thereon by the drafters of the model or uniform act."); Leake
v. Meredith, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Va. 1980) (noting that, in a suit for breach of implied
warranty of fitness arising from the lease of goods under Article 2, the court, in
addressing applicability of the section to a lease of goods, stated that the Official
Comments were "frequently helpful in discerning legislative intent... [but they)
should not become devices for expanding the scope of Code sections").
25. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, § 45.09.
26. See id.; see also Frederick J. de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 548-49 (1940).
27. See PEB Resolution, supra note 17, at vii (stating that the function of the
PEB Commentary is, inter alia, "to elaborate on the application of the UCC where
the statute and/or the Official Comments leaves doubt as to inclusion or exclusion of,
or application to, particular circumstances or transactions").
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provision "is not necessarily the one which the original
legislature would have indorsed, and as the distance between
enactment and interpretation increases, a pure originalist inquiry
becomes impossible and/or irrelevant."' This doctrinal approach
to statutory construction suggests that interpretation by courts
and agencies "over time," after the original intent has been
determined, is subject to adjustment to accommodate the
evolution of culture and society, "as society... adapts to the
statute, and generates new variations on the problem initially
targeted by the statute."' Clearly, the PEB Commentary serves
as a tool or mechanism for dynamic interpretation of the UCC by
representatives appointed by its sponsoring agencies, the ALI
and NCCUSL.3 This mechanism brings about an evolution in
interpretation consistent with the policy goals reflected in
Section 1-102, namely, clarity of commercial laws and uniformity
of construction.31 PEB Commentary No. 3 Sections 9-306(2) and
9-402(7) ("PEB Commentary No. 3") is an example of this role of
the Commentary. 2 PEB Commentary No. 3 serves a coordinating
and harmonizing function by clarifying a conflict between two
sections of Article 9 (1972) on the survivability of a security
interest upon the transfer of collateral by the debtor when
authorized or consented to by the secured party.' The
Commentary was not only promulgated eighteen years after the
relevant statutory provisions but also after prior case authority
construed the relationship between the two provisions.'
Similarly, PEB Commentary No. 1 Section 2-507 ("PEB
Commentary No. 1") revised Official Comment 3 to Section 2-507.
The language of the Official Comments limited the seller's right
28. WALfAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 5-6
(1994) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 9-10. But see Anthony D'Amato, Robert S. Marx Lecture: The Injustice
of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 911, 912 (1996) (arguing
that the separation of powers doctrine provides insurance against courts taking on
"quasi-legislative powers").
30. See PEB Resolution, supra note 17, at viii (declaring that the PEB
Commentary may be issued "whether or not a perceived issue has been litigated or is
in litigation, and whether or not the position taken by the PEB accords with the
weight of authority on the issue.").
31. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1999).
32. PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary No. 3
(Mar. 10, 1990), reprinted in U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) (Findex/PEB Commentaries
1990] [hereinafter PEB Commentary No. 3].
33. See id.
34. See id.; Bluegrass Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 942 F.2d 381,
386 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a secured party's assertion that its perfected
security interest in transferor's inventory extended to inventory acquired by the
transferee after the transfer).
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of reclamation in cash sales to the same ten-day period imposed
in credit transactions under Section 2-702. PEB Commentary No.
1 concluded that this limitation was an unjustified limitation on
the implied continuation of common law precedent in the
statute.35 PEB Commentary No.1 adopted the minority view on
the issue ten years after the majority view was rejected in Burk
v. Emmick."
In the context of PEB Commentary No. 11-addressing the
suretyship principles of Revised Article 33 7-the process of
supplementary commentary went beyond the process espoused
by dynamic interpretation. Here, substantial changes and
elaborations were made early in the enactment process, with
little time between enactment and interpretation, raising a
scepter of quasi-legislative rewriting rather than interpretation
of the text of the statute.'
For the twenty-nine jurisdictions that enacted Revised
Article 3 before the PEB Commentary was issued,39 the
Commentary was not a part of the legislative history. However,
for those jurisdictions enacting the Revised Article after PEB
Commentary No. 11 was issued in final form, the Commentary
was part of the legislative history, altering the prior meaning of
the statute and providing evidence of the intent of the legislators.
A strong inference exists that such supplemental commentary
has resulted in a non-uniform adoption of suretyship rules by
those jurisdictions enacting prior to the Commentary, rules that
35. See PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary No.
1, at 4 (Mar. 10, 1990), reprinted in U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) [Findex/PEB
Commentaries 1990] [hereinafter PEB Commentary No. 1]; see also Florida E. Coast
Properties, Inc. v. Best Contract Furnishings, Inc., 593 So. 2d 560, 562 & n.5 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the seller improperly asserted a right to reclaim
goods under Section 2-507 from the landlord who acquired them under the terms of
the lease agreement with the buyer based on the revised Official Comment).
36. 637 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1980).
37. PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary No. 11
(Feb. 10, 1994), reprinted in U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) [Findex/PEB Commentaries
1990] [hereinafter PEB Commentary, No. 11].
38. See id. The PEB Commentary was issued on February 10, 1994, less than
three years after the enactment of Revised Article 3. See id.
39. See State UCC Variations Binder, supra note 8A, at xix. Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana
(approved July 15, 1992; effective July 1, 1993; amended June 25, 1993; effective
date extended to January 1, 1994), Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming all enacted Revised Article 3 prior to the issuance of
either the proposed commentary (May 20, 1993) or PEB Commentary No. 11. See id.
Alaska, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Oregon all enacted Revised
Article 3 within seven to thirty days after the proposed commentary was issued, but
prior to the issuance of PEB Commentary No. 11. See id.
890 [36:883
REVISED ARTICLE 3
are distinguishable from the enactments following PEB
Commentary No. 11.
II. SURETYSHIP - SOME SUBTLE BUT SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
At early common law, the surety was recognized as the
"favorite of the law.' This preferred status was reflected in the
surety's complete discharge of its obligation upon any change by
the creditor of the debtor's obligation-no matter how slight the
change or how beneficial the change to the surety (such as a
reduction in the interest rate) and even though no harm
resulted.41 This position as the "favorite of the law" was
weakened as a result of the balancing of the equities between the
surety and the creditor under the Restatement of Security and
former Article 3.' Now, under Revised Article 3, the surety
stands as the disfavored of the law, trading places with the
creditor. 4
40. See, e.g., National Bank of E. Ark. v. Collins, 370 S.W.2d 91,94 (Ark. 1963)
(stating that the guarantor is a "favorite of the law" and that when the principal
debtor was released upon payment, the obligation of the guarantor was likewise
extinguished); Citizens' Trust Co. v. Tindle, 199 S.W. 1025, 1029 (Mo. 1917)
(acknowledging the doctrine that sureties are the "favorites of the law" and will not
be held beyond the precise terms of the fidelity bond); Buck v. Reed, 363 S.W.2d 479,
483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962) (holding that surety is a favorite of the law and
that the liability of the surety is "strictissimi juris"), reu'd on other grounds, 370
S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1963).
41. See ARTHUR ADELBERT STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYsHIP § 79 (4th ed.
1934) (noting that the view that a surety's obligations should not be discharged
when a change in the obligation has been made to his benefit has generally been
rejected on public policy grounds).
42. See generally RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 114-143 (1941) (eliminating,
for example, the complete discharge of the surety when a modification to the original
terms of the agreement are beneficial to the surety and the automatic discharge of
the surety when the principal and the creditor make an agreement to extend the
time of payment by the principal).
43. For example, Former Section 3-606 provides:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that
without such party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any
person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of
recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the
instrument or collateral or otherwise discharges such person, except that
failure or delay in effecting any required presentment, protest or notice of
dishonor with respect to any such person does not discharge any party as to
whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary,
or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on
behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a right of recourse.
U.C.C. § 3-606(1) (1989).
44. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-605 cmts. 2, 4 (1990) (stating that, in direct contrast
with the common law, an extension of time given by the creditor to the principal no
1999] 891
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Unlike Revised Article 3, the Restatement,"; the second most
significant review and assessment of the rights and duties of the
surety in the 1990s, provides greater parity between the interest
of the surety (denominated secondary obligor by the Restatement)
and the creditor or the obligee. Under UCC Section 1-103, the
general law of suretyship, as reflected in the Restatement and
case authority, remains relevant to suretyship issues raised
under the revised Article." Coordination of rights under Revised
Article 3 and the Restatement produces some subtle and
significant variations in results. Care must be taken in
determining the applicability of each body of rules and in
distinguishing the effect of the rules. As the following analysis
demonstrates, the suretyship principles of Revised Article 3
should head the list of provisions to be revised again.47
A. Accommodation and Accommodated Parties
In litigation under the former Article, courts often had
difficulty (and continue to have difficulty) determining the status
of one who signed as an accommodation party with the purpose of
"lending his name to another party to" the instrument. 4"
Accommodation status was often denied to a party who signed as
a maker or who received a benefit, no matter how indirect or
tenuous.49 Revised Article 3 clarifies this issue by expressly
longer discharges the surety, unless it can be proven that the surety suffered a loss
as a result of the extension of time).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1996) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
46. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999).
47. The November 20, 1989 draft of Section 3-606 imposed a duty on the
creditor to make a written reservation of right and to give the surety notice of the
discharge of the accommodated party in order to prevent the discharge of the surety.
See U.C.C. § 3-606 (Tentative draft of November 20, 1989). Between late November
and early May, the drafting committee made a 180-degree turn in the focus and
direction of the section. See U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 3 (1990) (changing Former Section 3.
606 by eliminating any duty on the part of the creditor to formally reserve rights).
48. See Neil 0. Littlefield, Payments: Articles 3, 4, and 4A, 52 BUS. LAW. 1527,
1529 (1997); see, e.g., First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. Maxon, 534 N.W.2d 37, 41-42 (S.D.
1995) (holding that accommodation status arises only upon indorsement outside the
chain of title despite language in the statute that an accommodation party may sign
in any capacity). But see Glimcher v. Reinhorn, 587 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (applying Former Article 3 and finding that an accommodation party's
obligation is determined by the capacity in which he signs).
49. See, e.g., Cooperative Fin. Ass'n v. Garst, 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1387 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (holding that a wife who was not a partner in the business enterprise
and did not receive any benefit from the loan other than her husband's continuing
investment was not entitled to summary judgment on accommodation status); FDIC
v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 552, 558 (D. Del. 1987) (stating that
value received used to retire corporate loan on which officers were co-signers
constituted a benefit negating accommodation status); Lasky v. Berger, 536 P.2d
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providing that an accommodation party may sign the instrument
in any capacity-as a maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser-and
is only denied accommodation party status if a direct benefit is
received from the value given for the instrument.' Thus, an
accommodation party who is also an officer of a corporation that
receives loan funds to be used as working capital is still an
accommodation party, even though the officer signed individually
as a maker and received a previously set salary paid from the
proceeds of the loan, the same as any other employee.' Here, the
corporation is the direct beneficiary of the value received for the
instrument, not the officer. 2
Under Former Article 3 Section 3-415, "accommodated
party" was not a defined term. Instead, its definition arose by
implication from the definition of "accommodation party."' The
accommodation party was that party to the instrument who was
"lending his name to another party" to the instrument.' Hence,
the accommodated party was the party to whom the
accommodation party was lending his name.'
1157, 1159 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that the creditor served as an undisclosed
accommodation party on a loan for its debtor and was denied accommodation status
when the creditor sought reimbursement from the debtor's father, the other
undisclosed accommodation party).
50. See U.C.C. § 3-419() & cmt. 1 (1990).
5L See Citibank v. Van Velzer, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 145, 147-48
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the receipt of a limited partnership interest and a
construction contract by the accommodation party for serving in this position is an
indirect benefit and does not change the party's status); Chandler v. Maxwell Manor
Nursing Home, Inc., 666 N.E.2d 740, 750-51 (fl. App. CL 1996) (identifying
employment compensation or shareholder dividends as indirect benefits in
construing and employing the UCC "accommodation party" test, and absent a direct
benefit, as persuasive authority for determining if a party to a contract was a
surety).
52. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-419 cmt. 1 (1990).
53. U.C.C. Section 3-415 provides: 'An accommodation party is one who signs
the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party
to it." U.C.C. § 3-415(1) (1989).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977). In Gelt, a
maker signed a note to acquire funds on behalf of a lender's (payee's) stockholder-
officer to be used by him to acquire stock of a corporation that later merged with the
lender. See id. at 1308. The lender sued on the note, and the maker asserted that it
was an accommodation party. See id. at 1310. The court held that the maker was not
an accommodation party because the maker was not lending its name to another
party to the instrument. See id. at 1311. The facts suggested that the entities were
alter egos of the stockholder-officer. See id. at 1311. As such, the payee, a party to
the instrument, was the accommodated party. Another example is Berkshire Bank v.
Schwartz, 191 A.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). In Schwartz, the bank, with
knowledge of the maker's capacity, made a loan to a sole signatory, a surety
incorrectly termed an accommodation maker under Former Article 3. See id. The
signatory immediately paid the proceeds to a third party. See id. Although the third
party was the direct beneficiary of the proceeds, it was not a party to the instrument
19991 893
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
Unlike the former Article, Revised Article 3 defines and
limits the classes of parties who may become accommodated
parties.56 By definition, accommodated party status is available
only to those who were parties to the instrument at the time of
issuance and for whose benefit value is given at the time of
issuance." Consequently, any party to the instrument whose
obligation arose after issuance and for whom another becomes a
surety will not be deemed to be an accommodated party under
Revised Article 3. If a post-issuance accommodation occurs, this
definition will create an obstacle to applying Section 3-419 and
correctly determining the rights and remedies that suretyship
status accords accommodation parties. As a result of this change
in definition, general suretyship law will govern the rights
between this obligor-called the principal obligor under the
Restatement-on the instrument and its surety-the secondary
obligor-who is also a party to the instrument.5 Because the
principal obligor was either not a party when the instrument was
issued or was a party at issuance, but the instrument was issued
for another's benefit, the obligor is not an accommodated party.
Although the obligor's relationship to another party to the
instrument is a suretyship one, Revised Article 3 will not govern
this suretyship relationship but will govern the rights and duties
between the one who falls within the narrow definition of
"accommodated party" and the same surety on the same
instrument. This technical difference creates difficulty for the
creditor because the surety, who is a secondary obligor to one
party and an accommodation party to another, will have greater
protection under the general law of suretyship than under
Revised Article 3.59 Potential areas of difference between rights
and remedies of general suretyship law as reflected in the
Restatement and Revised Article 3 include: the right of
reimbursement, the right of enforcement or subrogation, and the
obligation to preserve the secondary obligor's right of recourse,
formerly called the doctrine of reservation of rights."
and was not an accommodated party. See id. If the bank had a right of enforcement
against the third party, general suretyship law should govern the rights between the
maker and the third party. Refer to note 46 supra and accompanying text. If not, the
maker is not a surety and only has a right to be indemnified based upon an express
or implied contract.
56. See U.C.C. § 3-419(a) (1990).
57. See PEB Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 2; U.C.C. §§ 3-105(a), 3-
419(a) (1990).
58. See PEB Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 2.
59. Refer to notes 61-98 infra and accompanying text.
60. Refer to notes 61-98 infra and accompanying text.
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B. Accommodation Party's Rights Against the Accommodated
Party
1. Reimbursement. General suretyship law imposes an
obligation upon the principal obligor to reimburse its surety or
secondary obligor." This duty of reimbursement arises from an
implied contract after maturity and payment or performance of the
underlying obligation by the secondary obligor.' If the principal
obligor is not chargeable with notice of the secondary obligation (for
example, when the creditor obtained a secondary obligor after the
principal obligor concluded the transaction without informing the
principal obligor) then the secondary obligor is not entitled to
reimbursement but may still recover in restitution for any benefit
received by the principal obligor.' The secondary obligor is
permitted to recover to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
principal obligor from the performance of the secondary obligor."
Recovery, however, is limited to the amount of the principal
obligor's enrichment rather than the reasonable outlay by the
secondary obligor.' Such an outlay might include reasonable
expenses incurred by the secondary obligor in determining the
existence of any defenses or in asserting defenses of the principal
obligor.66 The Restatement also includes reasonable incidental
expenses and attorneys fees as part of a claim for reimbursement.
Similar to the Restatement principles, Revised Article 3
statutorily authorizes a right to reimbursement upon payment by
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 22(1)(a)-(b). The Restatements
Section 22(1) provides:
(1) Except as provided in § 24, when the principal obligor is charged with
notice of the secondary obligation it is the duty of the of the principal obligor
to reimburse the secondary obligor to the extent that the secondary obligor.
(a) performs the secondary obligation; or
(b) makes a settlement with the obligee that discharges the principal
obligor, in whole or part, with respect to the underlying obligation.
Id.
62. See id. § 22(1) cmt. a.
63. The Restatement's Section 26 provides:
The secondary obligor is entitled to restitution from the principal obligor to
the extent that the secondary obligor's performance of the secondary
obligation, or settlement with respect to it, relieves the principal obligor of
its duty pursuant to the underlying obligation and the principal obligor has
no duty to reimburse the secondary obligor for the cost of its performance.
Id.
64. See id.
65. See id. cmts. a, d.
66. See/U § 23 cmt. a
67. See id.
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the accommodation party." By its terms, Revised Article 3
appears to authorize reimbursement in all cases. This position
was clarified in PEB Commentary No. 11.69 Revised Official
Comment 5 to Section 3-419 reflects an intent to modify the rule
of reimbursement that exists under the general law of suretyship
and to displace the rule of restitution." Without justification, the
PEB Commentary asserts that the "right [to reimbursement] is
not limited," and further provides that "the right of restitution
that is present in the general law of suretyship is superfluous."71
Despite the language of PEB Commentary No. 11, can an
accommodated party who did not know of the accommodation
limit the accommodation party's recovery to restitution in those
jurisdictions that enacted the Revised Article before the 1994
PEB Commentary? Twenty-nine jurisdictions enacted the
revisions to Article 3 with an effective date before PEB
Commentary No. 11 was published in final form.72 In these
jurisdictions, assuming the requirements of current Section 1-103
and its commentary are met, that is, the general law of
restitution has not been "explicitly displaced," does the general
law of suretyship supplement and the distinction between
reimbursement and restitution remain relevant?" The concern is
one of fairness to the accommodated party, who has not
requested, assented, or consented to the accommodation of its
obligation nor was provided with notice that an accommodation
was necessary or subsequently acquired. Should restitution be
available to prevent abuse by a holder who is closely associated
with the accommodation party or who maintains an ongoing
business relationship with the accommodation party?74 Revising
68. See U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (1990) ("An accommodation party who pays the
instrument is entitled to reimbursement from the accommodated party....").
69. See PEB Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 3-4 (asserting that Revised
Section 3-419(e) codifies the accommodation party's right to be reimbursed by the
accommodated party-a right which, unlike the general law of suretyship, is not
limited to situations in which the accommodated party was charged with notice of
the accommodation party's obligation).
70. See id.; U.C.C. § 3-419 cmt. 5 (1990).
71. See PEB Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 3-4.
72. Refer to note 39 supra and accompanying text.
73. See U.C.C. § 3-419 cmts. 6 & 7 (1990); see, e.g., Venaglia v. Kropinak, 956
P.2d 824, 834-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (authorizing the supplementation of discharge
under Section 3-605 with common law principles of discharge for impairment of
recourse recognized under Restatement Section 44).
74. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Abrogation of Surety's Right of Discharge on
Release of the Principal Obligor Under Revised Article 3: A Creditor's Tool for
Maximizing Self-Interest, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 661, 666-68 (1991) (asserting that, to
miniTize abuse, reimbursement against a nonconsenting debtor should be limited to
the amount paid to the creditor).
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Revised Article 3 would provide an opportunity to address the
need, if any, for limiting the right of reimbursement or, at least,
for justifying the change in the common law rule.
2. Subrogation. General suretyship law authorizes
subrogation, the surety's standing in the shoes of the obligee and
recovering from the principal obligor on the basis of the obligee's
rights.75 After total satisfaction of the underlying obligation, the
secondary obligor is subrogated to all rights of the obligee to the
extent of performance by the secondary obligor."
Under Revised Article 3, subrogation remained in a state of
flux until the final draft of the PEB Commentary. Initially,
Revised Article 3 neither authorized subrogation nor abolished it
but rather granted the accommodation party a right to enforce
the instrument acquired from the obligee." Furthermore, the
PEB Commentary initially took conflicting positions on
subrogation. First, the Commentary stated that the right to
enforce authorized in Section 3415 was "essentially" a
codification of the general law of suretyship right of
subrogation.78 Second, in the proposed text of revised comment 4
to Section 3-605 on the effect of an extension on the
accommodation party's right to enforce the instrument, the text
distinguishes the right to enforce from subrogation.' However,
the final draft of PEB Commentary No. 11 took the position that
the accommodation party's right to enforce the instrument after
payment was "essentially" the codification of the right of
subrogation and deleted the contrary position from revised
comment 4 to Section 3-605.s0
Two consequences flowed from the early attempt to
distinguish the right to enforce the instrument from subrogation.
The first consequence created some difficulty for the
accommodation party. By enforcing the instrument, but not as a
subrogee, the accommodation party no longer stood in the shoes
of the obligee who may have been a subsequent holder in due
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 27 & cmt a.
76. See id. (noting that "since the underlying obligation has been satisfied, no
interest of the obligee is prejudiced by permitting the secondary obligor to enforce
the obligee's rights").
77. Section 3-419(e) provides that: "an accommodation party who pays the
instrument... is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accommodated
party." U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (1990).
78. See PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code: Proposed Final
Draft, at 3 (May 20, 1993) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft].
79. See id. at 18.
80. See PEB Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 4; U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 4
(1990).
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course. The accommodation party became, at best in its own
right, a holder with notice that the instrument was overdue or
subject to an uncured default s" and was, therefore, subject to all
claims and defenses that the accommodated party might raise
including any extension or release granted by the creditor.82
Second, because the drafters distinguished subrogation from the
right to enforce, subrogation should be available through
supplementation of Section 3-419 by the general law of
suretyship. The comments did not reflect an intent to displace
the doctrine of subrogation, but rather distinguished it from the
right to enforce the instrument.
Additionally, subrogation, an equitable assignment or an
assignment by operation of law, is a remedy designed to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the principal obligor and is
distinguishable from the Article's shelter doctrine, which
grants the transferor's status in the instrument to a
transferee.' Moreover, although a transfer is distinguishable
from presentment,84 the holder's demand for payment and the
surrender of the instrument' should yield transferee status to
81. See U.C.C. § 3-302(2) (1990).
82. U.C.C. Section 3-302(e) provides:
If (i) the person entitled to enforce an instrument has only a security
interest in the instrument and (ii) the person obligated to pay the
instrument has a defense, claim in recoupment, or claim to the instrument
that may be asserted against the person who granted the security interest,
the person entitled to enforce the instrument may assert rights as a holder
in due course only to an amount payable under the instrument which, at
the time of enforcement of the instrument, does not exceed the amount of
the unpaid obligation secured.
U.C.C. § 3-302(e) (1990).
83. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 27 cmts. a, g, and
ROBERT A. HULmAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 15.0211] (1985), with U.C.C. § 3-201(1) & cmt. 3 (1990).
84. U.C.C. Section 3-501(a) provides:
"Presentment" means a demand made by or on behalf of a person entitled to
enforce an instrument (i) to pay the instrument made to the drawee or a
party obliged to pay the instrument or, in the case of a note or accepted
draft payable at a bank, to the bank, or (ii) to accept a draft made to the
drawee.
U.C.C. § 3-501(a) (1990).
85. U.C.C. Section 3-501(b)(2) (1990) provides:
(a) The following rules are subject to Article 4, agreement of the parties, and
clearing-house rules and the like:
(2) Upon demand of the person to whom presentment is made, the person
making presentment must (i) exhibit the instrument, (ii) give reasonable
identification and, if presentment is made on behalf of another person,
reasonable evidence of authority to do so, and (iii) sign a receipt on the
instrument for any payment made or surrender the instrument if full
payment is made.
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the accommodation party." Section 3-203 defines transfer as
the delivery' by a person other than its issuer for the purpose
of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce
the instrument.' Section 3-419 grants the accommodation
party the right to enforce the instrument;9 consequently, the
accommodation party, upon surrender of the instrument by the
holder, should be a transferee. Thus, the accommodation party,
as a transferee, has available, under the shelter doctrine of
Section 3-203(b), all of the holder's rights in the instrument
against the accommodated party.' However, asserting the
holder's rights under the shelter doctrine is not equivalent to
the secondary obligor's rights under the historical doctrine of
subrogation. The accommodation party as transferee would not
accede to the holder's rights in any collateral given to secure
the instrument. Happily, the final version of revised comment
5 to Section 3-419 gives the same effect to the right to enforce
the instrument as existed under the former Article.' "Under
ordinary principles of suretyship the accommodation party
who pays is subrogated to the rights of the holder paid, and
should have his recourse on the instrument."' In those twenty-
nine jurisdictions that enacted Revised Article 3 before the
effective date of PEB Commentary No. 11,' is the right of
enforcement distinguishable from the historical right of
subrogation? Must subrogation be asserted under Section 1-
103 to be effective? Revising Revised Article 3 would resolve
this dilemma.
3. Preservation of Recourse. To prevent the discharge of an
accommodation party and to preserve the accommodation party's
right of recourse against the accommodated party, Former Article
3, consistent with general suretyship law, permitted the holder
(obligee) to reserve rights against the accommodation party when
granting the accommodated party a release, an extension in time
for payment, or other modification of the underlying obligation.'
This reservation of rights, whether oral or written, resulted if the
Id. § 3-501(b)(2) (1990).
86. See id. § 3-203(a).
87. See U.C.C. § 1-201(14) (1999) (defining "delivery" as a voluntary transfer of
possession).
8& See U.C.C. § 3-203(a) (1990).
89. See id. § 3-419(e).
90. See id. § 3-203(a)-(b).
91 See id. § 3-419 cmt. 5.
92. U.C.C. § 3-415 cmt. 5 (1989).
93. Refer to note 72 supra.
94. U.C.C. § 3-606(2) (1989).
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obligee merely stated, "I am reserving my rights against the
accommodation party." Consequently, the holder's rights against
the accommodation party were preserved and, concomitantly, the
accommodation party's rights were preserved against the
accommodated party, even though the debtor might not
understand the effect of the statement."'
The Restatement continues this "preservation" of the right of
recourse with the much needed requirement that the express
terms of the release or extension preserve the recourse of both
the obligee and the secondary obligor." The secondary obligor's
rights against the principal obligor are retained as though the
release or extension did not occur.
Although the original commentary to Revised Section 3-605
abolished the doctrine of reservation of rights, the revised
comment 3 to Section 3-605 eliminates the necessity of reserving
rights to preserve recourse against the accommodation party,
rather than abolishing the doctrine.97 The accommodation party's
rights are preserved by statutory law in Section 3-419."s
Given the forgoing differences, consider the following
hypothetical situation:
A and B are co-makers of a note payable to C. The note is
issued for A's benefit alone to C. C seeks to discount the
note to D, who insists on a surety for C's obligation. S
indorses the note. What differences in outcome occur if
95. See Jenkins, supra note 74, at 669-72 (discussing the reservation of rights
doctrine).
96. The Restatement's Section 39 provides:
To the extent that the obligee releases the principal obligor from its duties
pursuant to the underlying obligation:
(a) the principal obligor is also discharged from any corresponding duties of
performance and reimbursement owed to the secondary obligor unless the
terms of the release effect a preservation of the secondary obligor's recourse
(38);
(b) the secondary obligor is discharged from any unperformed duties
pursuant to the secondary obligation unless:
(i) the terms of the release effect a preservation of the secondary obliger's
recourse (§38); or
(ii) the language or circumstances of the release otherwise show the
obligee's intent to retain its claim against the secondary obliger ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39(a)-(b). The obligee's rights against the
secondary obligor may be preserved in the absence of an express term in the release
under limited circumstances. Refer to note 122 infra and accompanying text
(discussing this limited exception).
97. Compare Proposed Final Draft, supra note 78, cmt. 3 at 15-17, with PEB
Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 16-17.
98. See U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (1990). Refer to note 89 supra and accompanying text
(stating that an accommodation party that pays the instrument is entitled to
reimbursement from the accommodated party).
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any of the following actions take place? D releases C; D
releases A and B; B releases A; S releases A.
(1) The Parties and Their Roles:
A is a maker and the sole accommodated party.' The note
was issued for value for A's benefit alone."" B, who signed the
instrument as a maker to incur liability without receiving a
direct benefit of the value given, is an accommodation maker.'1
Although not defined in Revised Article 3, C is the payee, the
person to whom the instrument is payable, and an indorser.'"
Therefore, Revised Article 3 will govern the rights and
obligations of these three parties.
S signed the instrument to incur liability without being a
direct beneficiary of the value given to A when the instrument
was issued. Therefore, S is an accommodation party, despite the
fact that S's engagement arises after the instrument was
issued.,03 S's status as an accommodation party is further
demonstrated by the placement of S's signature outside the chain
of title before C's signature, indicating that S is an anomalous
indorser, an indorser who is not a holder of the instrument and
an accommodation party."' However, S is an accommodation
party only for A, the sole accommodated party on the instrument
and the only party for whose benefit value was given at
issuance.5 Therefore, Revised Article 3 will govern the rights
and obligations among A, B, S, and D, the holder of the
instrument.
In its relationship to C, S is a secondary obligor or surety.'"
The Restatement adopts a functional definition of suretyship, and
99. See U.C.C. § 3419(a) (1990). Refer to note 58 supra (illustrating that an
accommodated party is a party to an instrument that is issued for value given for his
or her benefit).
100. See U.C.C. § 3419(a) (1990).
101 See id. § 3-419(a)-(b).
102. See id. § 3415(a).
103. See id. § 3419(a)-(b).
104. See id. §§ 3-419 cmt. 3, 3-205(d) & cmt. 3; see, e.g., J. & B. Schoenfeld Fur
Merchants, Inc. v. Kilbourne & Donohue, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 466,469 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that under Former Article 3, when a corporation's agent's signature
indorses an instrument without any reference to his representative capacity outside
the chain of title, it can be inferred that the agent is an accommodation indorser).
105. See U.C.C. § 3419(a) (1990).
106. The Restatement's Section 1 provides:
(1)... [A] secondary obligor has suretyship status whenever.
(a) pursuant to contract (the "secondary obligation"), an obligee has
recourse against a person (the "secondary obligor") or that person's
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the relationship between C and S satisfies this functional
definition.0 7 D is entitled to only one full performance with
respect to the obligation owed by C but has a right of recourse
against both S and C."0 8 As between S and C, C, who received the
value given by D for the note, rather than S, should perform the
engagement to pay. Consequently, the relationship between D, C,
and S is a suretyship one within Section 1 of the Restatement.1 "
The rules and principles of the general law of suretyship apply
when determining the rights and obligations of parties to the
instrument regarding any action taken by D against or in
relationship to C as a principal obligor or indorser."' Unless S
agrees that the provisions of Revised Article 3 will govern its
obligation, D must consult the general law of suretyship... when
contemplating an action such as extending the time of payment
or otherwise modifying an obligation that might adversely affect
S's rights as a secondary obligor of C." But, D must consult
Revised Article 3 with respect to B and S's rights as
accommodation parties for A and C's rights as an indorser of A's
obligation."3 To further complicate the matter, the instrument
has multiple accommodation parties with rights among them. An
action by D, such as releasing either of the accommodation
parties or granting either an extension in time, may adversely
affect the rights of the other, limiting D's right of recourse
against the accommodation party whose rights have been
impaired.1
4
property with respect to the obligation (the "underlying obligation") of
another person (the "principal obligor") to that obligee....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 1(a).
107. See id.
108. See id. §§ 1(1)(b), 1(2)(a)-(b).
109. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 3-419(a) cmt. 3 (1990) (stating that an
accommodation party is always a surety).
110. See U.C.C. § 3-419 cmt. 3 (1990).
111. Alabama, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas have general suretyship statutes. See ALA.
CODE §§ 8-3-1 to 8-3-42 (1993); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2787-2847 (West 1994); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10-7-22 to 10-7-57 (1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3047-3070 (West 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-401 to 28-11-420 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 22-03-01 to
23-01-15 (1997); OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 371-385 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 56-2-1 to 56-2-17 (Michie 1997); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-
34.05 (West 1999).
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, §§ 40-41.
113. See U.C.C. § 3-415 (1990). Refer to note 98 supra.
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, §§ 52-61; U.C.C. § 3-116 (1990).
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(2) D Releases C:
a. The Restatement View. D releases C and seeks to
recover from S. S (a secondary obligor) has rights of recourse
against C (the principal obligor) including reimbursement,
subrogation, and the right to insist on C's duty of performance."'
D's release of C impairs S's right of recourse if D failed to
expressly preserve D's right of recourse against S and S's rights
against C."6 If D preserves recourse for both S, the secondary
obligor, and itself, S's rights against C are maintained as though
the release did not occur." ' Failure to preserve recourse against
both C and S will release and discharge C not only from its duties
to D but also from any corresponding duties to S."' Contrary to
the prior rule under the Restatement of Security"' and former
Article 3,' the Restatement permits the obligee, D, to release C
and preserve D's right of recourse against S without preserving
C's corresponding duties to S." The obligee's rights against the
secondary obligor may be preserved by implication from the
language of the release or circumstances that indicate an intent
to recover from S even in the absence of express preservation.' "
For example, if the release occurs when the principal obligor is
insolvent or because the principal obligor lacks the capacity to
contract, two primary reasons an obligee seeks a secondary
obligation to prevent loss, preservation of recourse is implied.'"
The effect of this exception is to create a safety net for the obligee
who fails to preserve recourse in the two instances when the
failure is most likely to occur-insolvency and incapacity of the
principal obligor.
At first blush, this ability of the obligee to release the
principal obligor while preserving recourse against the
secondary obligor appears to result in unfairness to the
secondary obligor with the potential for abuse and even
collusion between the obligee and the principal obligor.
However, Restatement Section 39 permits a discharge of the
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 38.
116. See id.
117. See id § 38(2).
118. See id § 38.
119. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 122(b) & cmt. a (1941).
120. See U.C.C. § 3-606(2) (1989).
121 See RESTATEIENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39(b)(ii) & cmt d.
122. See iU
123. See id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 4, 6; see also iU. § 34 cmt. c (indicating that the
lack of capacity to enter into an obligation is one of the reasons an obligee insists on
having a secondary obligor).
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secondary obligor if the release of the principal obligor causes
the secondary obligor loss.1"4 But this right to a discharge for
loss caused by the release of the principal obligor when the
obligee fails to preserve the secondary obligor's recourse
carries with it the burden of persuasion on the fact and
amount of loss for the professional surety or corporate officer
or owner." Despite its goals of avoiding a windfall to either
party through adherence to traditional rules, facilitating
receipt of the "benefit bargained for" without
overcompensation, and achieving parity among the parties, in
the context of release, the Restatement scale is tilted in favor of
the obligee. The obligee may release the principal obligor and
retain rights against the secondary obligor, who must bear the
burden of establishing its loss, unless the loss is "not
reasonably susceptible of calculation or requires proof of facts
that are not ascertainable,"126 without the imposition of any
corresponding duty on the obligee to notify the secondary
obligor of the release.' Although the Restatement
acknowledges or "tips its hat" at the need for notice, none is
required." Surely, the secondary obligor must introduce
evidence of circumstances, including its diligence in
attempting to acquire facts of the principal obligor's assets or
financial status at the time of the release or expert testimony
to establish its inability to calculate or to ascertain the amount
of loss but not the fact of loss,"9 before it is discharged from its
obligation to perform. Notice of the principal obligor's release
would, at the very least, assist the secondary obligor in its
effort to ascertain facts and to acquire and/or preserve
evidence of the principal obligor's assets or ability to perform
at the time of the release."'
Thus, under the Restatement, if D releases C, expressly
preserving both D's and S's right of recourse, C is released from
its obligation to D but not from its obligation to S. 3' Further, S
124. See id. § 39(c)(ii).
125. See id. § 49(2)(a)(i) & cmt. b.
126. Id. § 49(3)(b).
127. See id. § 38 cmt. b.
128. See id.
129. See id. § 49(3) (shifting the burden of persuasion to the obligee once the
secondary obligor demonstrates the prejudice caused by the impairment of recourse
and that the amount of loss is not reasonably susceptible of calculation or requires
proof of facts not determinable).
130. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-515 (1999) (permitting, under Article 2, any party,
upon reasonable notification to the other, to inspect, sample, and test goods to assist
in ascertaining the facts and preserving evidence).
13L See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39(a).
[36:883904
REVISED ARTICLE 3
must perform the secondary obligation." If D releases C and
neither the language nor the circumstances indicate an intent to
preserve D's rights against S, then both C and S are
discharged.' Where the language or circumstances indicate an
intent to preserve D's rights against S without preservation of S's
rights against C, S is discharged to the extent of the loss
resulting from D's impairment of recourse against C-if S carries
its burden of persuasion."
b. Revised Article 3"s Perspective on Release. Contrary to
the position of the Restatement and Former Article 3,"= release of
C by D without reserving rights neither discharges the holder's
rights against the accommodation party nor the accommodation
party's rights against the accommodated party." D's rights
against S are preserved by Section 3-605(b), and S's right of
recourse is preserved by Section 3-419(e).3 7 Revised Article 3
eliminates the necessity of reserving rights."
What is gained by these changes in suretyship law? Those
creditors who may have forgotten to reserve their rights upon
release of the accommodated party are protected." However, the
inherent unfairness that existed under the former rule of
reservation of rights is intensified. First, under the reservation of
rights doctrine, the creditor had an obligation to use words like:
"I reserve my rights against the accommodation party [surety]."
The accommodated party might believe that the release resulted
in a complete discharge of her obligation. Much to her surprise,
the debtor would discover that neither she or the surety were off
the hook-both were still obligated."' Rather than assume that
132. See id § 39(b).
133. See id. § 39 cmt. d.
134. See id § 39(c)(ii); see also id. § 49(2)(a) (listing the occasions upon which the
secondary obligor has the burden of persuasion in showing a loss caused by an act of
the obligee).
135. See id. § 39(a)-(b)(i); U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(a) (1989).
136. See U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990); see also id. § 3-604(a) (describing how a
discharge can take place).
137. See id. §§ 3-605(b), 3-419(e).
138 See i. § 3-605 cmt. 3 (indicating that Section 3-605 eliminates the
necessity for the obligee to formally reserve rights against the accommodation party
in order to seek recourse from that party).
139. See, e.g., i. (noting that the creditor's recourse against sureties and
accommodation parties is preserved whether the creditor formally reserves its rights
or not).
140. Refer to notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text (detailing the
reservation of rights doctrine and how an accommodation party can reserve their
rights against the accommodated party).
141 See American Law Institute, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Commercial Code (Group No. 1), Notes and Comments to
Tentative Draft No.2- Article M, I (a), at 108 (unpublished draft) (Apr. 25, 1947)
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the statement meant she was no longer obligated but that the
surety was, the curious debtor might ask: '"hat does this
mean?" At least from the words, whether oral or written, the
debtor had some notice that the obligation was not completely
nullified and that the creditor's rights against the
accommodation party remained.""
Second, the creditor is permitted to substantially modify
the contractual relationship among the parties and to change
the risk assumed by the accommodation party without its
consent." With the revision, the accommodated party does not
know of its continuing liability or the accommodation party's
liability; moreover, the accommodation has neither the
opportunity to consent nor notice of a change in the
contractual risk undertaken when its engagement was made
on the instrument.1" The concerns of the 1947 drafting
committee still remain.
1 45
(3) D Releases A and B, but not C
a. Effect on Rights Against A, the Accommodated Party"'
Under Revised Article 3, neither S, the accommodation
party,47 nor C, the indorser14 1, are discharged upon release of A,
the accommodated party."4 No preservation or reservation of
[hereinafter Tentative Draft No.2].
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39 cmt. c (arguing that if the
obligee releases the principal obligor while preserving the secondary obligor's
recourse, then the principal obligor cannot reasonably expect its duties to be
discharged with respect to the secondary obligor).
143. See U.C.C. § 3-605(d) (1990) (noting the effects of a material modification
other than an extension in time).
144 See Jenkins, supra note 74, at 661-64 (discussing the unfairness that
existed under former law and a modern theoretical justification for notice to the
accommodation party).
145. See Tentative Draft No.2, supra note 92, at 108 (reporting the Chief
Reporter and the Advisers' feeling that the reservation of rights was a trap and
should be discarded).
146. Refer to notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text (discussing A's status
as the sole accommodated party).
147. Refer to note 103 supra and accompanying text (noting that S is the
accommodation party because S incurs liability without directly benefiting from the
value given when the instrument was issued).
148. Refer to note 113 supra and accompanying text (discussing C's role as an
indorser of A's obligation).
149. See U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990). Refer to notes 99-100 supra and
accompanying text (discussingA's status as the sole accommodated party).
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rights is necessary to prevent the discharge of the
accommodation party' or to preserve S's rights against A.'51
All indorsers are not accommodation parties, but those that
are not, are guarantors or secondary obligors. C is an indorser
who signed without limiting its liability on the instrument, that
is, C did not indorse "without recourse."' Thus, C is deemed
under the comments to Section 3-605 to be a guarantor of
payment and is a surety' entitled to all the rights inherent in
that status.5 Although the accommodation party, who is a
surety, has its right of recourse preserved under Section 3-419,
an indorser, who is a surety but who is not an accommodation
party, does not have its right of recourse preserved by statute
under Revised Article 3.' With a deliberate, forced, or
intentional reading of the definition of "accommodation party" in
Section 3-419, an indorser could be held to be an accommodation
party, and thus, would be entitled to the right of recourse
preserved by statute against the accommodated party.'"
An accommodation party is one (1) who signs the
instrument, (2) with the purpose of incurring liability on the
instrument, (3) without being a direct beneficiary of the value
given for the instrument.' Any indorser who does not sign
"without recourse" will satisfy the requirements of (1) and (2)
because he or she will sign the instrument with the purpose of
incurring liability on the instrument.'o It is the third
requirement, "without being a direct beneficiary of the value
given for the instrument," that creates difficulty.'" If this last
requirement means without being a direct beneficiary of the
value given "when the instrument was issued," all indorsers will
satisfy this requirement. 1" If the requirement means without
150. See id. § 3-605 cmt. 3.
15L Refer to notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
152. An indorser may sign "without recourse" thereby disclaiming contractual
liability on the instrument but not any transfer or presentment warranties. See
U.C.C. § 3-415(b) (1990).
153. See id. § 3-605, cmt.1.
154. See id.
155. See id. § 3-419(e) & cmt. 3.
156. See id §§ 3-419(b)-(e) (noting that an accommodation party can sign as an
indorser and is entitled to reimbursement from the accommodated party).
157. See id. § 3-419(a).
158. See id. § 3-204(a) (defining an indorsement as a signature made on an
instrument to incur liability by the indorser).
159. Id. § 3-419(a).
160. See d. § 3-419 cmt. 1 (defining an accommodation party as a party who
signs an instrument for the benefit of the accomodated party, at the time the value
is obtained by the accomodated party or later, without receiving direct benefit from
the value obtained).
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being a direct beneficiary of the value given for the instrument
"at any time," then indorsers who subsequently negotiate the
instrument for value will not satisfy this requirement and should
not be held to be accommodation parties. The second construction
is the more reasonable and plausible construction. The first
construction would unduly limit accommodation party status to
those who are parties to the instrument at issuance and negate
the possibility of post-issuance accommodation should the
circumstances justify the addition of an accommodation party.
Consequently, indorsers who are not anomalous indorsers or who
are not otherwise shown to have signed to incur liability without
receiving a direct benefit are not accommodation parties with
rights preserved by statute, but, are sureties under the comment
to Section 3-605-at least in those jurisdictions that enacted
Revised Article 3 before PEB Commentary No. 11.161
Despite failing the test of Section 3-419 for accommodation
party status, an indorser generally satisfies the functional
definition of a secondary obligor under the Restatement.' The
holder or obligee has recourse against the indorser because of the
indorser's contractual obligation on the instrument;63 the obligee
is not entitled to the performance of the maker or drawer to the
extent that the indorser has performed and, conversely, is not
entitled to the performance of the indorser to the extent the
maker or drawer has performed." As between the maker or
drawer and the indorser, the maker or drawer should bear the
cost of performance.'65 The indorser who is not an accommodation
party must look to the general law of suretyship for its
suretyship rights.166
Unlike Revised Article 3, the general law of suretyship, as
reflected in the Restatement, requires an express preservation of
the indorser's rights, or the indorser is discharged.'67 Thus, D's
release of A discharges D's rights against A and C's rights
against A unless the release contained an express preservation of
161. See id. § 3-605 cmt. 1 (applying surety status to indorsers who are not
accommodation parties). Refer to note 39 supra and accompanying text (listing those
jurisdictions that adopted Revised Article 3 before PEB Commentary No. 11).
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 1 & cmts. b, h (explaining that
a secondary obligor means being answerable in some manner to the obligee even if
the secondary obligation is not identical to the principal obligation).
163. See U.C.C. § 3-415(a)-(b) (1990).
164. See id. § 3-415(a).
165. See id. §§ 3-412, 3-414(b).
166. See id. § 3-419 cmt. 3.
167. Refer to notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text (discussing the obligee's
need to preserve recourse).
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C's rights."i Furthermore, in the absence of an express
preservation and unless the circumstances or language indicate
D's intent to enforce the instrument against C, C is also
discharged from its indorser engagement. ' c
b. Effect on Rights Against B, the Accommodation Party-
Multiple Sureties: General Suretyship Law & Revised Article 3
B and S are accommodation parties ' and C, as an indorser,
is a guarantor of payment and a secondary obligor.' All are
sureties with respect to the same underlying obligation, A's
engagement to pay. Section 3-116 grants a right of contribution
to parties with the same liability on an instrument." However, if
in using the phrase the drafters intended "same liability" to be
limited to the concept of the type of engagement made, then B
and S do not have the "same liability" although both are
accommodation parties."n Furthermore, although S and C are
both indorsers, the text of Section 3-116 suggests that S as an
anomalous indorser, and C as an indorser in the chain of title,
should not be treated under Section 3-116 as having the "same
liability."7 4 This conclusion is consistent with the parties'
intentions at the time S's engagement was made. Although the
case is not presented here, "same liability" might reasonably
entail consideration of the facts and circumstances existing at the
time of an engagement beyond the type of engagement made in
order to further distinguish among classes of multiple
accommodation makers, such as cosureties and subsureties."
Here, however, all are sureties: B signed as a accommodation
maker; S signed as an accommodation indorser; and C is an
indorser. Despite this, they do not have the "same liability" on
the instrument. Further, because C is not an accommodation
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39(a).
169. See id § 39(b).
170. Refer to note 101 supra and accompanying tet (declaring B an
accommodation party because B incurred liability without direct benefit and
conferring the same status to S despite S's engagement after the initial issuance of
the instrument).
171. Refer to note 154 supra and accompanying text (noting that under Section
3-605, comment 1, C is a guarantor and a surety).
172. See U.C.C. § 3-116 (1990).
173. Refer to notes 101-03 supra and accompanying text (distinguishing S from
B by the fact that S's engagement arose after the instrument was issued).
174 See U.C.C. § 3-116 cmt. 2 (1990) (observing that indorsers usually do not
have joint and several liability unless both are anomalous indorsers or the
instrument is payable to two payees).
175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 53 & cmts. g, h.
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party, general suretyship law must govern the relationship
among the three sureties.176
As multiple sureties to the same obligation, rights of
recourse exist among the parties.177 The Restatement recognizes
two classes of relationships between multiple sureties: co-
suretyship and subsuretyship.1 78 In the absence of an express or
implied agreement among the sureties, a presumption arises that
the relationship is one of co-suretyship.79 If the multiple sureties
are co-sureties, each should perform part of the secondary
obligation."8° Performance by one of the sureties of more than its
contributive share entitles it to contribution from the others. 181
On the other hand, if circumstances, including an express
agreement, establish that one, the principal surety, should
perform rather than the one or more of the others, the
subsurety(ies), the relationship among them is one of
subsuretyship. 2 If the relationship is one of subsuretyship, the
principal surety and the subsurety have the same relationship
and rights as exist between the principal obligor and the
secondary obligor."8 Consequently, the subsurety is entitled to
reimbursement or restitution"' and has a right to demand
performance by the principal surety.1"
Although no agreement exists among our three hypothetical
parties, circumstances establish a subsuretyship relationship
among them. If S lacked notice of B's status as an
accommodation party at the time of S's engagement, S could
reasonably believe, from B's engagement as a co-maker, that B
was a principal obligor with an obligation to perform the
176. See U.C.C. § 3-419 cmt. 3 (1990); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999) (stating
that the U.C.C. is supplemented by the principles of law and equity).
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, §§ 52-53 (pointing out that the
relationship between multiple sureties, either being co-sureties or principal and
secondary subsureties, determines the parties' relative rights and duties).
178. See id. § 53(1).
179. See id. § 53(3).
180. See id. § 53(2).
181. See id. § 55.
182. See id. § 53(2); see, e.g., Johnson v. Guerra, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC)
178, 181 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995) (finding a subsuretyship relationship on the basis of
circumstances).
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 59.
184. See, e.g., Swanson v. Krenik, 868 P.2d 297, 299 (Alaska 1994) (stating that
a co-suretyship relationship, as to the holder, does not modify the subsuretyship
relationship based on circumstances); Schinnell v. Doyle, 496 P.2d 566, 570 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1972) (affirming that the seller's role in negotiating a loan for the buyer and
in being a surety of a specific obligation resulted in the seller being a principal
surety to ten general indebtedness guarantors). Refer to notes 61-67 supra and
accompanying text (distinguishing reimbursement and restitution).
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 21.
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instrument.1" In addition, even assuming that S had knowledge
of B's status as an accommodation party at the time of S's
engagement, if S reasonably believed that B, a prior secondary
obligor, assumed a greater obligation to perform-the economic
relationship of a principal surety-then S is a subsurety, and B is
the principal surety.' Having made an accommodation
engagement without the expectation of another with whom it
would share responsibility of performing A's obligation, it would
be unreasonable for B to expect to share the obligation with S.'"
Hence, S should be treated as a subsurety with all the rights that
a secondary obligor has against its principal obligor."=
As previously illustrated, S is a secondary obligor to C's
engagement on the instrument.90 C's status as a surety does not
change the nature of the relationship between these two. As
multiple sureties of A's obligation, B is the principal surety in its
relationship with C and S, and C is the principal surety in its
relationship with S.
As a subsurety, S, like the secondary obligor in its
relationship with the principal obligor, is entitled to have B bear
the cost of the performance owed to D." I Assuming D preserved
its rights against S with express language or by conduct
indicating an intent to recover from S,' D's release of B without
preserving S's right of recourse against B impairs the
fundamental right of the subsurety.' Releasing B without
186. See id. § 53(4)(a)(i) & cmt. IL
187. See i § 53(4) & cmt. g; see also Gigliotti v. Gigliotti, 406 A.2d 614, 615
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding the defendant not liable for contribution because
the defendant had a reasonable belief that her former husband was the principal
borrower); Kurzman v. Steir, 426 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (stating
that there was no basis in fact or law to lead the defendant to believe that another
secondary obligor was the principal obligor); Cook v. Crabtree, 733 S.W.2d 67, 69-70
(Tenn. 1987) (confirming the defendant's belief that she was a subsurety).
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 53 cmt. g (affirming that if
when a secondary obligor assumes its obligation without any assurance that an
extra secondary obligor would also be liable, any additional secondary obligor, who
mistakenly but reasonably believes the first secondary obligor is the principal
surety, becomes a subsurety).
189. See id- § 59.
190. Refer to notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 54 & cmt. a; see also Cool, 733
S.W.2d at 69 (discussing the relationship between the principal surety and the
subsurety).
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39(b) & cmt. d.
193. See i § 54 cmt. a (indicating that the right of one secondary obligor or
subsurety to have the principal obligor or subsurety bear all or part of the
performance is the fundamental right of suretyship, and that an obligee can impair
this right by preventing one secondary obligor from causing another secondary
obligor to bear the cost of performance).
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preserving S's rights eliminates B's duties of performance and
reimbursement."' D's release also negates the right of
subrogation because D no longer has rights against B.' Thus,
the release discharges S unless the release does not result in loss
for S.'96 If B is insolvent, lacks assets, or is otherwise judgment
proof at the time of the release, S does not suffer loss from B's
release.'97 Under these circumstances, the likelihood of S's
recovery against B in the absence of the release is negligible.
(4) B Releases A
Section 3-604(a) permits a person entitled to enforce an
instrument to discharge the obligation of a party to pay the
instrument.'98 B's discharge of A might occur by B's surrendering
of the instrument to A, canceling the instrument, attaching A's
signature on the instrument, or through adding words to the
instrument such as "Paid." ' Alternatively, B might agree to
discharge or renounce her rights against A in a signed writing. If
made prior to B's acquiring the instrument, the agreement
between A and B would not adversely affect A's obligation to
perform.200 However, Section 3-604 only permits one entitled to
enforce the instrument20 ' to discharge the obligation of a party to
the instrument.2 Furthermore, if the agreement was made when
the instrument was issued, B was not one entitled to enforce the
instrument but was an accommodation party, and thus, such an
agreement cannot adversely affect the rights of one entitled to
enforce.0 3
194. See id. § 39(a).
195. See id. § 39 cmt. f.
196. See id. § 39(c)(ii).
197. See id. § 39 cmt. f.
198. See U.C.C. § 3-604(a) (1990).
199. See id.
200. See id. § 3-604(b) (declaring that cancellation under subsection (a) will not
affect the rights of a party derived from the indorsement).
201. Section 3-301 provides that a "'[pierson entitled to enforce' an instrument
means i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a non-holder in possession of the
instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the
instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or
3-418(d)." Id. § 3-301.
202. See id. § 3-604(a).
203. See id. § 3-117 (indicating that the obligation of a party to pay the
instrument may only be released by a separate agreement if the instrument is
issued in reliance on the agreement); id. § 3-601(b) (noting that discharge of an
obligation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course who did not have notice
of the discharge).
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B will only satisfy the requirements of Section 3-604 if she
is: (1) a holder, the instrument has been properly indorsed and
delivered to her;2 ' (2) a non-holder in possession of the
instrument who has the rights of a holder because she is in
possession without proper indorsement as a transferee' or has a
right to enforce because of subrogation or legal succession,' or
possibly because she is a remitter, 7 a position that is not
relevant here; or (3) because she has a non-possessory right to
enforce the instrument because it has been lost, destroyed, or
stolen.2" Here, B will only acquire the instrument upon payment
of her obligation as an accommodation party to the holder, D, or
in performing the principal surety obligation owed to one or both
of the subsureties.'
a. The Effect of B's Acquisition and Release of A-Former
Article 3. Under former Article 3, B's possession of the
instrument is treated as a reacquisition under Section 3-2082I
and all intervening parties, C and S, are discharged."' This
result is consistent with the suretyship relationship between
these parties."u As prior analysis illustrated, both C and S are
204 See id. § 3-301 (noting that a person entitled to enforce an instrument can
be the holder of the instrument); see also § 3-604(a) (permitting only parties entitled
to enforce an instrument to exercise the right to discharge an obligation of a party).
205. See id. § 3-203(c) (permitting a transferee for value, who does not become a
holder because of the lack of a proper indorsement by the transferor, to require the
unqualified indorsement of the transferor).
206. See Smathers v. Smathers, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638-39 (N.C. CL App. 1977)
(holding that the plaintiffs physical possession of the instrument resulted in
transferee status, but not holder status, despite possession of the indorsement); see
also U.C.C. § 3-301 & cmt. (1990) (suggesting that a non-holder who can enforce an
instrument includes those who gain the rights of subrogation or anyone who is a
successor to the holder).
207. Refer to note 25 infra and accompanying text (listing authorities that
discuss the remitters right to enforce an instrument).
208. See U.C.C. § 3-309(a) (1990) (permitting a person not in possession of an
instrument to enforce the instrument if the person possessed the instrument and
was entitled to enforce it before it was lost, if the loss was not due to transfer or
lawful seizure and if the person cannot gain possession of the instrument because it
was destroyed, lost, or in the wrongful possession of another who cannot be found or
served with process). Revised Article 3 also empowers one from whom the drawee
bank recovers a mistaken payment or revokes acceptance of an instrument to
enforce the instrument. See id- § 3-418(d). If the instrument was previously honored,
the party disgorging the prior payment will no longer have the instrument. See id.
The recovery by the drawee bank of payment is treated as a dishonor satisfying the
condition precedent to imposition of liability on the drawer or indorser. See id.
209. Refer to notes 178-85 supra and accompanying text.
210. See U.C.C. § 3-208 (1989).
211. See iU.
212. Refer to notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text (discussing the
suretyship relationship among B, C, and S).
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subsureties in their relationship with B.2 1' No harm results under
the operation of the rule of reacquisition here. However, if an
agreement existed between B and some subsequent party so that
B, instead of the subsequent party, was in fact the subsurety, the
rule of reacquisition would adversely affect B's ability to enforce
the instrument against the subsequent party.214 B, however,
might recover on her right to reimbursement or restitution but
not on the instrument.215
b. Effect of B's Acquisition and Release of A-Revised Article 3.
Reacquisition, a rule of convenience that alleviates the necessity of
acquiring indorsements to revest a prior party with title to the
instrument, is defined in Section 3-207 of Revised Article 3.215
Reacquisition occurs if the instrument is transferred to a former
holder.217 B, an accommodation party, was not a former holder in
the hypothetical problem under consideration;2 18 therefore, the
reacquisition rule of Section 3-207 is inapplicable."9 Furthermore,
B's right to enforce or negotiate the instrument results from her
subrogation rights, which were acquired upon payment of the
instrument.220
As an accommodation party, B is only entitled to enforce the
instrument against the accommodated party,2 ' A, or seek
contribution from a co-surety.2" Under the general law of
213. Refer to notes 182-85 supra and accompanying text (discussing the
principal surety and subsurety relationship).
214 In this situation, B could not enforce the reacquired instrument against the
subsequent party because intervening parties are discharged from their obligation to
the reacquiring party. See U.C.C. § 3-208 (1989).
215. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999) (emphasizing that unless displaced by a specific
provision of the UCC, the principals of law and equity supplement UCC provisions);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 59 cmts. b-c (declaring that when a
subsurety performs the obligation, he has a reimbursement or restitution claim
against the principal surety).
216. See U.C.C. § 3-207 & cmt. (1990) (explaining that in cases when the
reacquisition is not a result of a negotiation and the instrument is not payable to the
holder, Section 3-207 dispenses with the requirement to obtain the indorsement of
the instrument).
217. See id. § 3-207.
218. Refer to note 101 supra and accompanying text (explaining that B signed
the instrument as a maker who received no direct benefit of the value given and is,
therefore, an accommodation maker).
219. See U.C.C. § 3-207 (1990).
220. See id. § 3-419(e) (stating that an accommodation party who pays the
instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accommodated party);
PEB Commentary No. 11, supra note 37, at 3 (clarifying that the "right to enforce" in
Section 3-419(e) effectively sets forth subrogation rights).
221. See U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (1990).
222. See id. § 3-116(b).
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suretyship, B, in her relationship with C and S, is the principal
surety to both because of the subsuretyship relationship." As the
principal surety, B is the principal obligor and the subsureties
are secondary obligors.' The principal obligor has no right of
recourse against the secondary obligor or subsurety.' The
principal surety bears the entire cost of performance as between
the principal surety and subsurety." No party exists to whom C
or S owe a duty of performance.' Therefore, B's release of A is
within B's right. Section 3-605, which has been problematic in
other contexts, is not a problem here.' After B's acquisition of
the instrument and discharge of A under Section 3-604, the
indorser, C, and secondary obligor, S, no longer have liability on
the instrument. Because neither owes a duty of performance to
anyone, no party remains who has a right of recourse against
these two.
(5) S Releases A
S is an accommodation party for A, a secondary obligor for
C, and the subsurety for B.' What impact if any occurs if S,
after paying D, the holder, releases A, the accommodated
party? Revised Article 3 applies to this action as it broadly
asserts in Section 3-605(b) that the "[d]ischarge ... of the
obligation of a party... does not discharge the obligation of an
indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse
against the discharged party.""° This discharge by S may occur
without the preservation of B's or C's rights against A."' B's
rights as an accommodation party are preserved by Section 3-
223. Refer to note 213 supra and accompanying text (describing the nature of
the subsuretyship relationship existing among B, C, and S).
224- See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 59.
225. See id. §§ 1 cmt. p, 61 cmt. a.
22P. See Ud § 59 cmt. a (explaining that because the relationship between the
principal surety and the subsurety is the same as that between the principal obligor
and secondary obligor, the principal surety ought to bear the entire cost of
performance).
227. See U.C.C. § 3-207 (1990) (restating Section 3-208 of the 1989 UCC-
intervening parties are discharged when prior party reacquires the instrument).
228. Refer to notes 135-45 supra and accompanying text (detailing the possible
misunderstanding of the rights of the secondary obligor if the principal obligor is
discharged).
229. Refer to notes 103, 107, & 189 supra and accompanying text (explaining the
relationship of S to the other parties).
230. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990).
231 See id. § 3-605 cmt. 3 (explaining that Section 3-605(b) eliminates the
necessity of expressly reserving the right of recourse against an indorser or an
accommodation party upon the discharge of the party).
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419 but C's rights against A are not preserved by statute.3 2 S's
failure to preserve C's rights against A discharges A's
obligation to C under the general law of suretyship,33 the law
that governs C's rights as a guarantor of payment. 34 However,
because B's obligation remains, C has recourse against B
should S recover from C.
S and B have a subsurety relationship; Revised Article 3
does not address issues relating to those who have a subsurety
relationship and, therefore, the general law of suretyship should
supplement. 5 Under the Restatement, the relationship among
the principal obligor, the principal surety, and the subsurety is
treated identically to that among the principal obligor, the
secondary obligor, and the obligee. 6 The suretyship defenses of a
secondary obligor are available to the principal surety, B, for
action taken by the subsurety, S, which impairs the principal
surety's right of recourse."
C. Recommendation
In revising the suretyship rules of Article 3, the drafting
committee created a quagmire for the creditor when the transaction
involves multiple parties. On its face, Revised Section 3-605(b)
favors creditors by facilitating retention of the surety. '38 Lulled by
the text of Revised Article 3, a creditor may engage in conduct that
minimizes its ability to recover. Consequently, an obligee will
always preserve rights to avoid an inadvertent discharge of the
accommodation party or other surety. Thus, any apparent benefit of
Section 3-605(b) is lost. The potential confusion and inconsistent
results under Revised Article 3, when substantively identical rights
on the same instrument are adversely affected, justify revising
Revised Section 3-605. Revised Article 3 should adopt the rules of
the Restatement to implement the goals of the UCC as stated in
Article 1: "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions... [and] ... to make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions." 9
232. See id. § 3-419. Refer to note 153-54 supra and accompanying text.
233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 39(a).
234. Refer to note 153 supra and accompanying text (discussing C's position as a
guarantor of payment).
235. Refer to note 186-89 supra and accompanying text.
236. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 45, § 59 & cmt. a.
237. See id. § 54.
238. Refer to notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text (noting that the
creditor may retain rights against an accommodation party even if he or she does not
expressly reserve these rights).
239. U.C.C. § 1-102(a), (c) (1999).
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Ill. OTHER MINOR ADJUSTMENTS
A The Co-Maker's Rights Clarified
While creating havoc in some of the suretyship principles,
Revised Article 3 clarifies one point of confusion under former
law-the co-maker's right to contribution. Several jurisdictions,
notably Texas, took the position that a co-maker was not a surety
and, therefore, was not entitled to use the suretyship defenses or
to contribution if it performed more than its ratable share of the
obligation.' Revised Article 3 rectifies the unfairness of this
former position. Section 3-116 deems those with the same
liability as jointly and severally liable and grants a right of
contribution between them."4 Read in conjunction with the
suretyship discharge rule of Section 3-605(b), Section 3-116
preserves the right of recourse of any remaining joint and several
obligor in the event of the release or discharge of the others."
Consistent with the recognition of a co-maker's right to
contribution, Revised Article 3 recognizes the increased risk to a
co-maker when an obligee impairs the value of an interest in
collateral given to secure the obligation of the other co-maker.2"
Section 3-605(f) authorizes a discharge to the extent of the
increased cost of the resulting performance for the one jointly
and severally liable from the impairment of the interest.2" The
240. See, e.g., Hooper v. Ryan, 581 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979,
no writ) (holding that Section 3-606 applies to sureties but not to co-makers). But see
United Counties Trust Co. v. Podvey, 389 A.2d 515, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978) (holding co-makers of a note to be sureties who were discharged by Section 3-
606).
241. See U.C.C. § 3-116 (1990). Section 3-116 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the instrument, two or more persons
who have the same liability on an instrument as makers, drawers,
acceptors, indorsers who indorse as joint payees, or anomalous indorsers are
jointly and severally liable in the capacity in which they sign.
(b) Except as provided in Section 3-419(e) or by agreement of the affected
parties, a party having joint and several liability who pays the instrument
is entitled to receive from any party having the same joint and several
liability contribution in accordance with applicable law.
(a) Discharge of one party having joint and several liability by a person
entitled to enforce the instrument does not affect the right under
subsection (b) of a party having the same joint and several liability to
receive contribution from the party discharged.
Id.
242. See id. § 3-116(c).
243. See id. § 3-605().
244. See id § 3-605(f). Under Former Article 3, no guidance was given on
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discharge is limited by the co-maker's right of contribution, or the
extent to which the collateral secured the other's obligation of
performance; in any event, discharge should not exceed the right
of contribution."
Finally, Revised Section 3-605(f) resolves a potential
problem that may occur when the holder lacks notice that an
apparent co-maker is in fact an accommodation maker. Should
an impairment of the collateral result, Section 3-605(f) provides
that the undisclosed accommodation maker is entitled to
discharge only to the extent of a right of contribution, rather
than the right of reimbursement that an accommodation party is
otherwise entitled. 46 Thus, the apparent co-maker is assigned the
loss that results from the non-disclosure of the true nature of his
obligation on the instrument. 7 The effect of this clause of
Subsection (f) cannot be gleaned from the language of the text.
Only upon review of the comments is the significance of this
clause apparent. 8
B. The Issuer & Remitter: A Neglected Concern
The drafters of Revised Article 3 sought to clarify two
somewhat related concerns. First, the issuance of an instrument
is defined as the "first delivery of an instrument by the maker or
drawer... for the purpose of giving rights on the instrument to
any person,"" and second, the remitter is defined as "a person
who purchases an instrument from its issuer if the instrument is
payable to an identified person other than the purchaser."
50
Generally, a remitter purchases a cashier's check, teller's check,
money order, or traveler's check from an institutional issuer and
computing the extent of impairment. See U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(b) (1989) (declaring that
a party is discharged to the extent a holder "unjustifiably impairs" the collateral but
not defining "impairs"). Though somewhat cryptic, Revised Article 3 provides two
methodologies for measuring the extent of impairment. See U.C.C. § 3-605(e) (1990)
(stating that the value of an interest in collateral is impaired to the extent "the value
of the interest is reduced to an amount less than the amount of the right of recourse
of the party asserting [the] discharge," or "the reduction in value of the interest
causes an increase in the amount by which the amount of the right of recourse
exceeds the value of the interest").
245. See U.C.C. § 3-605(f) & cmt. 7 (1990).
246. See id. § 3-605 cmt. 7 (explaining that under Section 3-605(f) an unknown
accommodation party is treated as a co-maker with the right of contribution rather
than an accommodation party with a right of reimbursement); id. § 3-419(c) (stating
that an accommodation party who pays an instrument is entitled to reimbursement
from the accommodated party).
247. See id. § 3-605 cmt. 7.
248. See id.
249. Id. § 3-105(a).
250. Id. § 3-103(a)(11).
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does not thereby become a holder. 1 In response to increasing
concern about the rights of a remitter, 2 the drafters redefined
negotiation and transfer to exclude the issuance of an
instrument. Revised Section 3-201(a) provides that "Negotiation'
means a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or
involuntary, of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to
a person who thereby becomes its holder."'
Transfer is distinguished from negotiation as the delivery of
an instrument "by a person other than its issuer for the purpose
of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the
instrument."' Consequently, when an instrument is issued
neither a negotiation nor a transfer occurs under Revised Article
3. Other than obviating the possibility that the issuance of an
25L See id. § 3-201 cmt. 2.
252. See Gregory E. Maggs, Determining the Rights and Liabilities of the
Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument: A Theory Applied to Some Unsettled Questions,
36 B.C. L. REv. 619, 620 (1995) (examining several questions concerning the rights
of remitters under Revised Article 3 including whether a remitter can obtain a
refund of the purchase price of an instrument, whether a remitter can enforce an
instrument, whether a remitter makes transfer or presentment warranties, and
whether a remitter has implied contractual liabilities); Jane E. Tobin, Uniform
Commercial Code Commentary, The Rights of a Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument,
8 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REV. 260, 264-65 (1967) (discussing whether a personal
money order should be treated the same as a personal check or cashier's check and
whether a remitter has a right to stop payment of a cashier's check). See generally
David J. Benson, Stop Payment of Cashier's Checks and Bank Drafts Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 445 (1975) (examining whether
payment can be stopped on cashiers checks and bank drafts under the UCC); Brian
J. Davis, The Future of Cashier's Checks under Revised Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613 (1992) (analyzing the sources of
uncertainty regarding cashier's checks); Francis H. Fox, Stopping Payment on a
Cashier's Check, 19 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1978) (examining courts' treatment of rights
and obligations arising from the issuance of cashier's checks); Lary Lawrence,
Making Cashier's Checks and Other Bank Checks Cost-Effective: A Plea for Revision
of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 AINN. L. REV. 275 (1980)
(highlighting the problems associated with the failure of Articles 3 and 4 to establish
separate rules for the various types of commercial paper and suggesting that the
UCC be amended to allow the cashier's check to better serve the role of a cash
substitute); John M. Norwood, Cashier's Checks and the Bank's Right to Deny
Payment, 108 BANKING L.J. 476 (1991) (surveying the approaches of various courts
to the issue of whether payment of a cashier's check may be denied by a bank);
George Wallach, Negotiable Instruments: The Bank Customer's Ability to Prevent
Payment on Various Forms of Checks, 11 IND. L. REV. 579 (1978) (discussing the
obstacles to stopping payment of a bank instrument even when the bank is
cooperating); Note, Blocking Payment on a Certified, Cashier's, or Bank Check, 73
MIcL L. REV. 424 (1974) (suggesting amendments to the UCC to clarify the rights
and interests of the bank, remitter, and payee of a business check) [hereinafter Note,
Blocking Payment]; Note, Personal Money Orders and Teller's Checks: Mavericks
Under the UCC, 67 COLUI. L. REV. 524 (1967) (examining the issues surrounding
stopping payment of personal money orders and teller's checks).
253. U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
254. Id. § 3-203(a).
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instrument constituted a transfer giving rise to transfer
warranties by the issuer, no other substantive change has been
made under Revised Article 3 by the new definitions. Issue was
distinguishable under Former Article 3 from negotiation by
definition, as well. 5 "'Issue' means the first delivery of an
instrument to a holder or remitter,"2 6' and "negotiation is the
transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee
becomes a holder." 7 Even in delivering a blank instrument to
the remitter under Former Article 3, no negotiation occurred
because the remitter did not become a holder."8 Contrary to
Revised Article 3, under Former Article 3, a blank signed
instrument was not deemed to be bearer paper; it was only an
incomplete instrument. 9 The remitter did not become a holder,
because a negotiation did not occur under the Former Article."'
Delivering an incomplete instrument to a purchaser under
Revised Article 3 is an issuance but the purchaser is a holder
because an incomplete instrument is bearer paper under the
Revised Article,261 and one in possession of bearer paper is a
holder.262
The concern is the availability of relief to the issuer who
wishes to retake possession of the instrument from a remitter
who may have engaged in fraud or failed to give consideration for
the instrument. Revised Section 3-202 permits any person to
rescind the negotiation of an instrument to the extent permitted
by other law, but does not address rescission of the issuance of an
instrument.263
Consider the following scenario: Issuer is induced by fraud to
issue a cashier's check to B, the remitter, payable to C's order.
Upon discovering the fraud, may Issuer reclaim the instrument?
Under Revised Section 3-202, Issuer may reacquire the
instrument from C, the party to whom the instrument was drawn
payable, after its delivery to C by B.2 11 Section 3-202 permits
255. U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(a) (1989).
256. See id.
257. Id. § 3-202.
258. See id. § 3-202.
259. See id. § 3-115 (stating that a signed, incomplete instrument can not be
enforced until completed); id. § 3-111 cmt. 2 (explaining that a blank, signed
instrument must be treated as an incomplete order instrument falling under Section
3-115).
260. See id. § 3-202 cmt. 1.
261. See U.C.C. § 3-115 (1990).
262. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1989).
263. See U.C.C. § 3-202(b) (1990).
264. See id. § 3-202 cmt. 2 (explaining that a holder in due course of an
instrument, even an instrument negotiated to the holder by a thief, is protected
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Issuer to employ several remedies, such as replevying the
instrument or enjoining the further negotiation of the instrument
by C, if C is not a holder in due course.2' Issuer would assert the
right to rescind the negotiation by B to C.' However, assume
Issuer discovers the fraud before B negotiates the instrument to
C. No provision of Revised Article 3 authorizes rescission of the
issuance of the instrument. What recourse is available to Issuer?
Revised Section 3-306 subjects any person "taking an
instrument," other than a holder in due course, to claims of a
property or possessory right in the instrument or its
proceeds.2" Although the issuance of the instrument is neither
a negotiation nor a transfer of the instrument, it is by
definition the first delivery of the instrument resulting in the
remitter's "taking" of the instrument.' Used repeatedly
throughout Revised Article 3,2" neither "take""° nor any of its
derivatives is defined. Only in the context of conversion is light
shed upon the meaning of the term. In distinguishing when
payees have a right to assert an action in conversion against a
proper defendant, namely the depositary or drawee banks,
comment 1 to Revised Section 3-420 limits the right to those
who have received delivery.271 Only upon delivery to a payee is
the payee deemed to have "taken" the instrument for the
obligation. 72 "The payee receives delivery when the check
comes into the payee's possession."' Thus, the remitter
"takes" the instrument upon the "voluntary transfer of
possession"27 4 of the instrument when it comes into remitter's
actual or constructive possession.' Having taken the
against the claim of a rightful owner).
265. See id. § 3-202, cmt. 2.
266. See id. § 3-202(b).
267. See id. § 3-306.
26& See id. § 3-105(a).
269. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 3-307(b)(2), 3-403(a), 3-404(b)(2), 3-503(c), 3-
418(c), 3-419(c).
270. In describing a holder in due course, Section 3-305 of former Article 3
substituted the term "takes" for the term "holds" which appeared in Section 57 of the
Negotiable Instrument Law. See U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1 (1989).
271. See U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (1990).
272. See id. §§ 3-420(a), 3-310(b); see also Peoria Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jefferson
Trust & Say. Bank of Peoria, 410 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ill. 1980) (reasoning that the
plain meaning of the word "take" is to "get into one's possession," so a check
delivered to the payee's desk was deemed to be "taken" for the purposes of Section 3-
303(b)).
273. U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (1990).
274. U.C.C. § 1-201(14) (1999).
275. See U.C.C. § 3-420(a)(ii) (1990) (stating that a payee can receive delivery
either directly or through delivery to an agent or co-payee).
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instrument, the remitter is subject to any claims that the
issuer might assert." 6
Historically, the law has recognized three kinds of rights in
an instrument: claims or equities of ownership, legal title of legal
ownership, and equities of defense." Claims, rights of restitution
arising when possession of an instrument is voluntarily and
intentionally transferred to another, were distinguished from
equities of defense, a right to resist payment when liability on an
instrument was established." Equities of defense fall into two
categories: real defenses and personal defenses.7 ' Both claims
and legal title were defined as property rights; with legal title
resting in the one to whom the promise to pay ran.280 Legal title
was distinct from a claim, a right to reclaim possession when
legal title had been voluntarily transferred or surrendered to
another." These distinctions were blurred under Former Article
3.2 The terms remain blurred under Revised Article 3, which,
without including claims in recoupment,' "expands" the concept
of "claim" under Former Article 3.' The drafters failed to
disclose the particulars of this "expansion."
276. See id. § 3-306.
277. See WILLIAM EVERETT BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES §§ 155-156, at 453 (2d ed. 1961); see also Brian A. Blum, The Use of the Jus
Tertii Defenses By an Obligor On a Negotiable Instrument, COM. L.J., Jan. 1979, at
131 (explaining the types of third party claims and defenses); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1104, 1111 (1918) (defining equities of
ownership and equities of defense); Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of
Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1066 (1954) (discussing "real defenses");
Note, Blocking Payment, supra note 252, at 428 n.29 (reviewing the three classic
definitions of legal title, equitable title, and contract defenses); Comment, Adverse
Claims and the Consumer: Is Stop Payment Protection Available?, 67 Nw. U.L. REV.
915, 921 (1973) (distinguishing "claims" from "defenses" as used in the UCC).
278. See BRITTON, supra note 277, § 156 at 456.
279. See id. § 155 at 453.
280. See Chafee, supra note 277, at 1112.
281. Refer to notes 278 and 280 supra.
282. Although Revised Article 3 continues the distinction between claims and
defenses, some have argued that the distinction between the two under former
Article 3 was unjustified and others have argued that the distinction was
unintended. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 277, at 134 (asserting that the distinction
between claims and defenses is not intended to have significance); Note, Blocking
Payment, supra note 252, at 433 (declaring that there is no sound reason for the
distinction between claims and defenses).
283. See U.C.C. § 3-306 cmt. (1990) (explaining that claims to an instrument
under Section 3-306 are different from the claims in recoupment referred to in
Section 3-305(a)(3)); see also id. § 3-305(a)(3) cmt. 3 (explaining the claims in
recoupment).
284- See id. § 3-306 cmt. (listing types of claims allowed by Section 3-306 that
were not included in the former Section 3-305).
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An issuer might seek damages for breach of contract if the
consideration given by the remitter has failed; for example, when
a check negotiated to the issuer for a cashier's check is
subsequently returned for insufficient funds.' Alternatively, an
issuer might bring an action in tort for fraud or seek quasi-
contractual relief.' However, reclaiming the instrument to
prevent it from falling into the hands of a holder in due course is
the most beneficial course of action, given the likelihood that the
remitter might be insolvent or judgment proof.
Furthermore, Section 3411(b) imposes expenses and
consequential damages on an "obligated bank" that wrongfully
refuses to pay a cashier's or teller's check that it issued.' The
obligated bank is not subject to these damages, however, if the
refusal results from the bank's: (1) suspension of payments, (2)
the assertion of a claim or defense that the bank reasonably
believes is available against the person entitled to enforce the
instrument, or (3) if payment is prohibited by law.' The second
exception to the imposition of damages, when "the obligated bank
asserts a claim or defense of the bank that it has reasonable
ground to believe is available against the person entitled to
enforce the instrument,"' is susceptible to two reasonable
constructions. One construction is that the obligated bank may
refuse to pay if the bank has its own claim or defense to the
instrument. This construction is supported by the comments.' If
the obligated bank has its own defense, regardless of its source, it
may refuse payment without the potential exposure for
consequential damages. 1 An alternative construction is that the
obligated bank must have its own claim or defense, and the claim
or defense must be against the person seeking payment. In the
hypothetical presented, if Issuer is an obligated bank and has a
claim or defense against B, the remitter, the claim or defense is
not one against C, the person to whom B negotiated the
instrument.' Under the second construction, the bank must pay
285. See BRITroN, supra note 277, § 155 at 454.
286. See id (suggesting this course of action against a wrongdoer when an
instrument is negotiated to a holder in due course).
287. See U.C.C. § 3-411(b) (1990).
288. See id.
289. Id (emphasis added).
290. See id. § 3-411 cmt. 3 (proclaiming that the likely situation where a bank
could assert a defense is where there is reasonable doubt about the identity of the
person demanding payment).
29L See id.; see also TPO, Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1973) (suggesting
that an obligated bank issuing its cashier's checks for its obligation may raise
personal defenses against non-holders in due course).
292. See id § 3-411(b) (stating that consequential damages are not recoverable if
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or face consequential damages even if the holder is not a holder
in due course. This construction expands the scope of Section 3-
305, which limits the assertion of claims and defense beyond
holders in due course to non-holders in due course in this limited
context. 93 At least one other section of Revised Article 3 supports
this construction. Section 3-305(b) prohibits the assertion of
claims in recoupment against a holder in due course unless the
claim in recoupment arose from the conduct or obligations of the
holder in due course, that is, those that are personal as between
the holder in due course and the obligor."4 This construction for
Section 3-411 would be consistent with the public expectation
that cashier's checks, teller's checks, and certified checks
function as a cash equivalent as recognized by Section 3-411."'
Issuer's ability to reacquire the instrument is a significant
concern and becomes an even greater one under the second
construction.
Currently, Revised Article 3 does not authorize rescission of
issuance;96 however, Section 1-103 does permit supplementation
of Revised Article 3, and viable options are available to the issuer
for asserting its claim or equities of ownership such as replevying
the instrument or enjoining transfer, as well as rescission of the
implied or express contract between an issuer and a remitter on
the basis of fraud. 7 Comment 2 to Section 3-202 suggests that
the drafters only intended to limit the right of reclamation of an
instrument against those who are subsequent holders in due
course." Without the right to reclaim the instrument, the issuer
in the hypothetical context must hope that it has an opportunity
to assert its claim (rescission because of fraud) or its defense
(failure of consideration) against B if B should seek a refund299 or
to enforce the instrument, 3  an unlikely occurrence. Neither the
claim nor the defense is effective against a subsequent party who
an obligated bank refuses payment based on a reasonable claim against the person
entitled to enforce the instrument).
293. Refer to text accompanying note 264 supra (explaining the relationships
and rights of the hypothetical parties).
294. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305(b) cmt. 3, 3-411(b) cmt. 3 (1990).
295. See id. § 3-411 cmt. 1.
296. Refer to notes 263-66 supra and accompanying text.
297. Refer to notes 267-86 supra and accompanying text.
298. See U.C.C. § 3-202 cmt. 2 (1990) (recounting the rule that a holder in due
course may take an instrument even from a thief and be protected against a claim of
a rightful owner).
299. See Maggs, supra note 252, at 639 (noting that many banks allow a
remitter to return an instrument if he or she decides not to negotiate it to the
payee).
300. See id. at 646-50 (discussing the rights of a remitter to enforce the
instrument).
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is a holder in due course."1 With any delay in reacquiring the
instrument, Issuer runs the risk that the instrument may fall
into the hands of a holder in due course. Further development of
the rights and obligations between an issuer and a remitter,
including an express right to rescind the issuance of an
instrument, should be included on the list of revisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the process of revising Article 3, the drafting committee
hastily restructured the rights between the person entitled to
enforce an instrument and the accommodation party. The
resulting principles not only deprive the accommodation party of
traditional rights but also modern equities recognized by the
Restatement and Former Article 3. This Article demonstrates the
likely confusion confronting the creditor/holder who seeks to take
advantage of rights that Revised Article 3 presumes to provide,
and the courts that seek to apply these principles. Although the
rules of Revised Article 3 are perceived to elevate the creditor to
the position of the "favorite of the law," they may in fact prove to
be a trap resulting in loss. The unwary creditor may
inadvertently lose presumed rights because of the
supplementation of Revised Article 3 by the general law of
suretyship, especially in the context of an indorser who is a
guarantor of payment under Section 3-605 in transactions
involving multiple sureties, or when the creditor requires a post-
issuance accommodation.
Finally, with increased reliance by courts on the PEB
Commentary and the growing promulgation of the Commentary,
what parameters, if any, should be placed on the use of the
Commentary by the courts under applicable principles of
statutory construction? Should the doctrine of Separation of
Powers, which provides insurance against courts taking on the
"quasi-legislative" powers on the federal level, be likewise
applicable to state courts in their role vis-h-vis state legislatures?
If so, this doctrine should carry even greater weight when "quasi-
legislative" power is exercised by an independent sponsor of
statutory law. Despite the long hard battle to achieve codification
of Revised 3, the plea of "[Revise] it again," will only increase as
time goes by.
301. See U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (1990) (stating that the right of a holder in due course
to enforce the instrument is not limited to a defense allowed under Article 3 or a
claim in recoupment).
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